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SIX RADICAL
IDEAS
[EDITOR'S NOTE.- The Director of
the Center for Public Interest Law was
invited to deliver the annual Traynor
Lecture to the California Judicial College in July 1991. The title of the address was "Six RadicalIdeas." Most of
the presentation dealt directly or indirectly with the broad problems of state
regulation, ranging from discipline of
the trades and professions to the regulation or prevention of criminal conduct.
The following are abridgedexcerptsfrom
that address.]
One temptation [in addressing such a
distinguished group] is to deliver a scholarly treatise, consistent with the desirable self-image of the academician. Here,
one takes a dynamic and dogmatically
emotional position on an obscure issue,
or chooses a strongly relevant, timely, or
emotional issue, but confines remarks to
contradictions, ambiguities, and dilemmas. One of the advantages of discussing dilemmas is that they can be addressed with great profundity and one
does not have to take a clear position.
The temptation to talk about dilemmas and make no judgment about where
the dilemma stops and the better answer
begins is a sad result of the misuse of the
Socratic method by law school faculty.
We spend hours cross-examining our students to identify the variables which underpin a judicial opinion or policy preference, and we alter and twist them so
their weaknesses and limitations are exposed. We convince our students that
their answers are wrong-or at least that
they have serious flaws. And we do that
for three years. Some students then reach
the false conclusion that since every position taken is flawed, all are relative,
and the difference between them is a
matter of minor import. This approach
feeds nicely into the "hired gun" adversary system-all is fair to advance the
interests of my client since that is my
job, and there are really are no moral
absolutes. This approach does not serve
the interests of truth or justice, and has
created an inefficient, delayed, and dishonest system for the resolution of civil
disputes in this state and nation-which
we'll discuss in a moment.
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The "all is relative" spirit of law instruction misreads the meaning of
Socrates. Cross-examination may well
expose the flaws in any imaginable position, and they all have counterarguments
and legitimate limitations. But some ideas
and some policies are, relatively speaking, better than others. And ideas which
are simply by degree better may well
determine how people live, when they
die, and what kind of world we leave to
our legatees in the millennia to comewhich, I suggest, are the proper overall
tests of human morality. An idea which
is relatively better than another idea is
worthy of advocacy, strong advocacy.
Some men and women have given their
lives to advance such ideas-and some
of those sacrifices receive, rightfully, a
special measure of respect.
Instead, I present to you six radical
ideas, or sets of ideas. They are intended
to make the court system function more
efficiently and, coincidentally, might
make your jobs a lot easier. Most of them
are directed at judicial or regulatory policies. These six ideas are not necessarily
politically radical; they are not left-wing
or right-wing. If you are over 22 years of
age, a "radical" idea is simply one which
makes a marked change, or perhaps is
one with which you very much disagree.
However, if you are under 22, a "rad"
idea is a great idea ... it's really bad,
which, of course, means good. Since
some of us are young at heart, we are
here using the latter definition.
IDEA #1: Judge the Constitutionality of State Searches by a Four-Part
Balancing Test. Our fourth amendment
was adopted to prohibit unreasonable
searches violating a reasonable expectation of privacy. The past thirty years of
common law miasma have wrought some
thirty separate doctrines, each with its
own rules, rationale, and case development. We have the warrantless search
incident to arrest, stop and frisk, the automobile search. We have the inventory
search and the hot pursuit search. We
have the emergency doctrine, the "crime
scene" allowance, and the plain sight
doctrine. We have regulatory searches,
subject to a very different set of rules.
We have added layer after layer of doctrines and exceptions, all developed

largely separately under different discrete categories or kinds of searches. Superimposed over this are changing doctrines of "consent" to search, "knock notice," and an evolving "good faith" exception. And, of course, there remains
the prospect of separate standards as to
each of these separate subdoctrines between federal and state jurisdictions.
[Notwithstanding the recent diminution
of "independent state grounds," California retains its separate Article I, section 1
constitutional assurance of privacy.]
We should start again from the beginning. Focus on the policy intent of
the fourth amendment and do not fragment into separate doctrines. These separate doctrines are simply the unfortunate
result of making policy by incremental,
discrete decisions. Each separate policy
wants to define itself, complete with its
own idiosyncratic terms of art which then
assume a life of their own and are further developed in a process not of rationalization, but largely independent
development.
Instead, we should decide all such
cases by direct reference to a four-part
balancing test, as follows: (1) What is
the justification for the search? Why
should we pretend that a search to find
out whether a dry cleaning establishment
has the proper posted bond is as important as a search to discover materials for
a nuclear weapon brought into the city?
(2) What is the degree of intrusion?
This would include an analysis of the
number of persons searched, the intimacy or nature of the search, and the
extent of reasonable privacy expectation
compromised. (3) What is the quantum
of probable cause to believe the items
legitimately to be seized are located
where the search occurs? (4) If we are
talking about a warrantless search, what
was the opportunity for the state to
obtain an individualized warrant? And
it would seem appropriate to balance these
four elements, so that a great justification
or need for a search to protect the public
would allow somewhat more of an intrusion with somewhat less probable cause.
One of the advantages of this mode
of analysis is that it exposes some of the
irrationality of our current mix of doctrines. Two such irrationalities are now
so cloaked. First, there is a "game" mentality which has slipped into our constitutional decisions. It goes like this: The
violation of the rights of an accused is
an offense which operates to the disadvantage of its victim. Where that victim
is about to be arrested, there will now be
a contest between him and the state. The
state is very powerful and it has just
violated one of the rules; this is unfair.
Therefore, we must even the score by
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giving to those who have suffered this
wrong some advantage in the contest to
compensate for the unfair advantage afforded the other side. This mode of
analysis is not articulated very often, but
it is clearly implicit in much fourth
amendment analysis. And it is regrettable. The four-part balancing test we
propose would refocus the analysis on
the value meant to be protected by the
fourth amendment: reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable state
intrusion.
The second irrationality exposed by a
balancing test is a corollary of the first.
For the cases hold that criminal investigations require more protection from unreasonable searches than do massive intrusions by the state for non-criminal
investigative purposes. We select those
offenses which are most dangerous to
the citizenry, most cruel, most needful of
suppression and prevention-and ascribe
to them criminal liability. And then the
courts ascribe the least latitude for
searches where for criminal investigation purposes. The courts have created a
sub rosa and unexamined balance, hidden through their discrete categories of
fourth amendment analysis, that there is
more need or justification for latitude in
conducting a building inspection measuring the precise tread width of newly
built stairs than there is to conduct an
investigation of a continuing series of
murders.
This bias is difficult to understand.
The four-part balancing test would reveal it since the justification or state interest in the murder investigation is more
legitimate and weighty than in the building inspection and it would be difficult
to deny that priority-if the variable is
discussed.
What is interesting is that the courts
have gone so far in allowing "regulatory" searches that they apologetically
permit evidence discovered in the course
of the stairs tread measurement indicating five mangled bodies in the attic.
"Well, it's okay to admit this evidence
even though the intrusion is great, because the state was not intending to find
evidence of a crime here. It just happened and, so as long as the state's intrusion was undertaken for regulatorypurposes, it is cleansed."
As we have mentioned, part of this
irrational reversal of defensible priorities may relate to the inexplicable "contest" theory. Again, this demands that
the murder suspect-who will lose more
than the stairs contractor if he is caughtmust therefore receive more protection
because more stringent rules are appropriate for the higher-stakes contest. This
is not a rational rationale.

In addition, the courts historically do
not trust the exercise of discretion by
police as opposed to regulatory officials.
The additional fear of search by an officer with a badge and gun may be properly considered to some extent under our
suggested "degree of intrusion" factor,
but what the courts do not appreciate
fully is that we do not have to fear
Orwell's 1984, enforced by police gestapo, but rather the more pernicious
Brave New World of Aldous Huxley.
The most likely American totalitarian
danger is not the armed police enforcing violent crime or drug statutes. It will
come in the form of regulatory controls
and tax assessments, fees and charges,
restrictions on what we can buy, how
we bank, what is insured and what is
not, on our transportation, our schools,
our groceries, our parks and land, our
right to build a fence out back, or to put
a sign in our car offering it for sale. It
will not be from police agents bursting
through the door wearing DEA hats and
brandishing guns. It will come with a
polite smile and business suit civility.
They will be tax officials, inspectors,
and regulators combing through our private lives, using the far more significant regulatory powers of the state to
control the citizenry from the top-by
quiet fiat, by phone calls, denied applications, liens, and assessments. Already,
the state licenses over 40 trades and professions, and none can be practicedfrom landscape architecture to the barber trade-unless or until a board first
so permits. Why should they put you
in jail when they can take everything
you have?
The four-part balancing test would
also better protect legitimate civil liberties threatened by the current system of
discrete "categories" or "doctrines"
which are rarely if ever reconciled. As a
result of the current confusion, we have
strangely contradictory rulings. For example, in People v. Scott, 16 Cal. 3d 242
(1976), an officer spotted a drunk standing at an intersection near a freeway offramp at 1:00 a.m. near the Golden Gate
bridge, urinating, with a small child. The
adult was legally drunk, the child cold
and crying. It was New Year's Eve so the
officers decided not to arrest the adult,
but to just transport both of them home.
Of course, they patted down the adult
since he would be in their car for the trip.
The court ruled that drug evidence properly found in the pat-down must be excluded-relying on the application of"incident to arrest" doctrine. [The officers
could have arrested, but chose not to do
so and lost the "incident to arrest" line of
cases which would have justified the
search.]

The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1991)

And then we have the other extreme,
last summer's U.S. Supreme Court decision in Floridav. Bostick, 59 U.S.L.W.
4708 (June 20, 1991), where massive
searches of bus and train passengers were
permitted without probable cause or even
suspicion, but on a "consent" basis. There
you are, sitting on a bus, when uniformed
and gun-toting officers, who have just
been randomly digging through the personal possessions of everyone on the bus,
ask you if you would mind if they look in
your suitcase. The only persons objecting are likely to be hard-core criminals
aware of the game.
The proposed four-part formula is unlikely to allow a "consent" category to
cleanse this kind of dragnet sweep-not
without a clear state justification for the
search and some measure of suspicion.
But the current irrational patchwork of
unrelated categories allows it.
The danger is not only that dichotomous decisions are countenanced, but
that one or more of these lines of decisions will either expansively apply the
protection to such an extent that other
legitimate societal interests are offended,
or will unduly constrict it, allowing a
hole through which state intrusion may
be accomplished en masse.
IDEA #2: A Civil Penalty SystemNot the Exclusionary Rule-to Enforce
Constitutional Search Standards. In addition to the proposed four-part test to
guide the determination of a fourth
amendment violation, let's consider an
effective remedy. At present, we have
the exclusionary rule. A lot has been
written about this subject, but there should
be little dispute about some basic consequences. A large percentage of criminal
proceedings involve search and seizure
and related questions, from preliminary
hearing objections to Penal Code section
1538.5 motions to trial and appellate
work. Probably the largest single subject
area of criminal litigation focuses on the
behavior of the police in investigating
crimes, not on the guilt or innocence of a
defendant. This complaint, and the compromise it entails for the truth-seeking
function of the trial, is hardly an original
concern. But there is another objection
equally valid. It doesn't work very well
to control the police. You would think
someone, after thirty years of applying
it, might figure out that we are still litigating a huge volume of abuses.
If you are a police officer and are
presented with a situation in which you
must bust down a door to stop an offender, arrest him and cart him off to jail,
skin-search him, make him get an attorney and make bail, and all of the rest of
it-and your sole sanction for busting
in the door is the possibility that the
1
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evidence you seize-which you may
never get unless you bust down the
door-will be excluded from a criminal
trial, what is your rational choice? The
evidence may not be excluded. If it is,
the defendant may be convicted anyway and, if he is not, he is certainly
sanctioned by the trial. You have immunity and if the case is lost, everyone
will blame the prosecutor or you or "the
system."
Here is a controversial idea. If a citizen violates the law, he or she should be
tried for the offense, and the trier of fact
should consider all relevant evidence in
a maximum attempt to determine what
happened. If the police violate a law or
constitutional standard, there should be
a trial or sanction directed at the wrong
sufficient to deter it. In each case, a rational system directs a sanction at a
wrong-as directly as possible. We
should, at some point, graduate from the
"nobody in this class leaves until the
person who took Johnny's sandwich confesses" mentality.
The exclusionary rule was not created by the courts operating as czar of
the universe. One of the disadvantages
of a system of checks and balances is
that different institutions have different
powers. Operating in a fragmented fashion, one branch of government may not
be able to solve its problems by its own
devices, and may have to hope one of
the other branches does so. You see, the
other side of the "checks and balances"
coin is a need to cooperate so that each
can function. For example, if the legislature cuts off funds to the judiciary, it
can limit the courts' efficacy. And even
with resources, the courts are limited in
their ability to respond by the severe
restrictions on their affirmative powers.
In the case of the exclusionary rule, the
court really had one option only: the
power to say "no" to evidence that is the
fruit of an unreasonable search. From
the court's perspective, what else could
it do? It is relied upon to protect the
values of the constitution, even if that
means reversing the more democratically
responsive decisions of other branches.
Protecting minorities and underlying values from the transitory passions of the
mob, the tyranny of the majority, the
ochlocracy-that may be the most important function the courts have. So they
said no to the evidence-the only remedy they control.
The real villains-the real nonfeasants
responsible for the exclusionary ruleare our legislatures, which have failed to
create any kind of meaningful remedy to
enforce the fourth and fifth amendments.
Apart from rare federal criminal civil
rights prosecution, generally reserved for
8

extreme cases such as murder, all we
have is a possible civil rights suit, generally by a convicted criminal against a
police officer in front of a jury. Oh, that
is somewhat of a remedy-as the escalating judgments for police misconduct
suggest. But in most cases the officer is
convinced the victim is a crook who will
not have the resources or credibility to
sue civilly. And the officer is more often
right than wrong. Then when there is a
judgment, it comes from the general fund,
and everyone blames the greedy plaintiff
lawyers and the bleeding heart judges or
the ignorant and easily misled jurors.
We pay the bill as a normal cost of government and everyone goes on their way
as before.
There is a solution, a deal which
should be struck which will make us all
better off. The legislature should enact a
meaningful remedy and the courts should
respond by scrapping the exclusionary
rule. The courts should continue, of
course, to exclude any evidence that is
unreliable, but if there is an abuse in the
manner of its acquisition, that could be
separately punished-directly and effectively. How? Borrow from Business and
Professions Code section 17200, mix in
some provisions from special prosecutor
legislation, salt lightly with financial penalties, and you have an answer: courtimposed civil penalties, ranging from
$500 to $100,000, assessed against the
police agency whose agents have committed the abuse. There is no jury to
persuade to give damages to a criminal.
There is no payment to any person.
Rather, the recovery goes into the general fund-or, better yet, to the victims'
restitution fund. The money comes from
the agency's budget and by law may not
be replenished. The loss does not fall
disproportionately on a single officer who
earns a very low wage and for whom
even a small penalty may discourage
many from pursuing a police career. It
comes from where it ought-the department setting the policies, the tone, and
providing the supervision.
One thing we know that bureaucrats
care about is their budget. In assessing
civil penalties for constitutional
breaches-with the penalty increasing
with severity, extent of the abuse, and
repetition by an agency, you have a direct, real, and effective remedy-and in
the hands of the one institution most
capable of properly applying it, the relatively independent courts. Such a proposal is currently in published form, Preprint SB 2 (Presley).
IDEA #3: Allow Legal Technicians
to Perform Low-Level Legal Services
Now Unavailable at Reasonable Cost.
A lot of things should be done on the

civil side to make our system of civil
litigation accessible and . . . civil. In
addition to fast-track, other ideas are
worth considering; some of them, such
as smaller juries, more liberal class action certification to allow more efficient
resolution of disputes, and various alternative dispute resolution ideas have been
discussed by others. In addition, the legislature is considering licensing a new
occupation: independent legal technicians
able to offer legal advice in areas where
current legal practice is too expensive
for most of the populace.
The poor, lower middle class, and
even much of the middle class are given
short shrift. Legal services in commonly
needed areas-consumer bankruptcy,
landlord-tenant, warranty, immigration,
and family law-are out of the price
range of a substantial portion of those
needing them. The time has clearly come
for the creation of a class of legal technicians to fill this need. We have drafted
another preprint bill, SB 1 (Presley),
which accomplishes this without the total deregulation regrettably recommended
in the initial State Bar report. Under this
bill, legal technicians could offer legal
advice and assistance in consumer bankruptcy, immigration law, family law, and
four other areas where there is evidence
of undersupply of services at current rates.
Some in the Bar object that there is a
danger of erroneous advice from such
practitioners-who would function as independent paralegal-type practitionerswithout required attorney supervision
(and without the attorney-siphoned fee
now charged). Critics of the Bar have
two only partly persuasive answers: first,
the persons who would be served currently have no legal assistance and the
creation of this class would be a net gain;
and second, the Bar is in no position to
get sniffy about competence when it licenses persons at the age of 25 based on
a single general examination and does
not, in fact, require any real showing of
competence in the actual area of practice, or limit those who might attempt to
practice in unlimited areas of substantive
expertise.
But notwithstanding this measure of
hypocrisy, those in the Bar expressing
concern about the consequences of erroneous advice have an important point.
Bad immigration or consumer bankruptcy
advice to the lower middle class or poor
person can most likely create irreparable
harm. The consumer is relying on the
practitioner. Unlike IBM hiring an attorney for antitrust advice, the individual
consumer is not in a good position to
judge competence himself. Here, the rationale for licensure is probably stronger
than with any other trade save physi-
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cians-the need may even surpass the
justification for attorney regulation. At
the same time, regulation must not be
so onerous that it unnecessarily inhibits
supply, since it is supply which will
enable adequate service at reasonable
rates.
We have proposed a system which
the Bar should long have had for itself:
Under SB 1, technicians would be regulated by a public member board, with
attorneys and technicians on an advisory board. They would be licensed by
specialty-e.g., consumer bankruptcy,
immigration-in one of seven areas.
They would have to pass an examination demonstrating competence in the
particular area(s) of practice in which
they are licensed, and they would be
periodically retested. They would contribute to a fund to compensate those
they injure, and there would be strict
discipline. But the entry barriers would
allow many to practice to meet a strong
and unmet need. It is possible to fashion
or customize barriers to entry to assure
the competence needed without unduly
constricting supply.
IDEA #4: Regulatory Agencies Exercise Substantial Unchecked Powers.
Judicial Deference is Excessive and
Dangerous, and Judicial Review Must
be Bolstered Through a Series of Reforms. A fourth area deserving radical
change is the way we review the
rulemaking of regulatory agencies. The
courts rightfully give some deference to
the policy judgments of a quasi-legislative body, but this deference has gone
too far. The courts are an important
check on excesses by agencies which
are increasingly powerful and
unmonitored. These agencies regulate
much of industry, most trades, and all
of the professions. They are unelected.
They receive ex parte contacts. They
are not monitored by the press. And
most of them operate as marginally constitutional creatures, consisting substantially of officials with current occupational ties to the trade or industry allegedly regulated in the interest of the general public.
Let me give you a quick example of
what I am talking about. The state Board
of Accountancy is controlled by CPAs
(certified public accountants), one kind
of accountant used for certain financial
report purposes, and who otherwise
compete with other kinds of accountants for the vast majority of accounting
business. Several years ago, the Board
decided to enforce a rule prohibiting all
but CPAs from using the terms "accountant" or "accounting" to describe
their services. One good way to eliminate competition is to capture the words

used to describe what you and your
competitors do. The yellow pages become your sole domain. The California
Supreme Court is now looking at this,
but the fact that a superior court and a
court of appeal bought off on this rather
transparent ultra vires measure illustrates the depth of the problem.
I suppose yet another example is the
current "DoggyScam" controversy; it
seems that our veterinarian board has
managed to adopt a rule prohibiting animal groomers from cleaning a dog's
teeth. This delicate task may be attempted only by licensed veterinarians
who, of course, control the Board.
The need for judicial check on cartel
abuse by regulatory agencies is illustrated by the way they are formed. They
are generally not created from consumer
demand, but from industry demand. I
have no idea why we have a landscape
architect board, or a barber board, or a
dozen others. Over the past several years,
various trades have proposed additional
boards to use the mantle of the state,
and your good offices, to enhance their
competitive status. Athletic trainers,
defined as anyone who coaches anyone
else,
have sought
a board.
"Aestheticians"-people who advise on
the proper use of make-up--have sought
a board; presumably they would involve
the state in determining what is and
what is not beauty. Related to this is the
attempt to license interior designers advising on proper building decor-given
the condition of many government buildings, we can't be too optimistic about
government standards here. And of
course, there was Senator Dills' attempt
to license astrologers several years
back-presumably to prevent chicanery
in the improper reading of the stars.
Notwithstanding their origin, courts
are usually willing to reverse agencies
only where the issue is one familiar to
them, such as a denial of procedural due
process or a conflict with the first amendment. For example, we once attended a
meeting of the Board of Guide Dogs for
the Blind, and one of the members of
the audience felt very strongly about a
proposed rule and argued against it. The
vote was taken by raising hands, and
when the citizen in the audience-who
was, of course, blind-asked for a roll
call vote, it was denied. That, the courts
will generally deal with. But in terms of
agency operation beyond legislative intent, or lack of substantial evidence to
support findings, or abuse of discretion,
the courts increasingly abdicate-that
is the clear trend. And it is regrettable
because of the importance of the courts
as a check on this otherwise growingly
powerful fourth branch.
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To buttress the court's role as such a
reviewer, consider the following kinds
of changes. First, institutionalize the use
of lists of experts upon whom courts
may call sua sponte to testify on the
record and subject to cross-examination. It is very difficult for a civil court
to ferret out the facts where the expert
for one side says "x" is true and the
expert for the other side says "y" is
true. Sometimes playing them back and
forth does not, contrary to conventional
wisdom, elicit the correct answer; it
leads to simply believing one or the
other. Having an expert not paid by
either side to explain and critique each
will increase the quality of the result
and the court's understanding of issues-and give the court more confidence to reverse. And, as one who has
monitored California's agencies for the
past twelve years, let me give you the
following bare generalization: they need
reversals and remands-they need you
to check them-you are the last resort
in this regard, and they are getting away
with an awful lot. And "awful" is the
correct adjective.
Second, let's start to do away with
amateur clerks. The courts of this state
need real staffs-professional and adequate. These decisions are very important; they affect how we shall live, our
rules, they create law-piece by piece.
Yet the major staff role is commonly
provided by people who have just graduated from law school, have no life experience, stay on the job one or two years,
and-since I am one of those teaching
these persons, I can tell you-they
should not be relied upon as they are.
Ironically, the higher you go into the
appellate process the more they are relied upon.
Third, let's train our judges. Currently, judges actually take the bench
days after appointment and are expected
to adjudicate cases in areas of the law
where they may not have practiced.
Judges, above all, should undertake formal apprenticeships for at least several
weeks in each major area of assigned
rotation (juvenile, family, law and motion, writs, criminal, etc.) priorto making binding decisions.
Fourth, we must accept a measure of
specialization in courts where the questions decided are particularly steeped in
jargon; cases reviewing difficult environmental, health, and macroeconomic
(such as major antitrust cases) issues
head this list.
IDEA #5: Agency Adjudications
Should be Handled Entirely by a Small
Number of Independent But Expert
Administrative Law Judges, Also Empowered to Impose Interim Remedies
1
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to Protect the Public, and Subject to a
Single-Step Court of Appeal Review.
Apart from agency rulemaking, the
courts also review agency adjudications. Here the need for reform is even
more critical, except here the courts
should do less rather than more. Let
me explain how it now works where
an agency-say, the Medical Board of
California-seeks to discipline a licensee. Step one: an administrative law
judge usually hears the case and makes
a proposed decision. Step two: the
agency board reviews the record and
may entirely reject the ALJ's decision.
There are no limitations on this agency
review. It is conducted by persons who
have no knowledge of evidence or law.
In the case of the Medical Board, for
example, it is a seven-person board
mostly consisting of practicing physicians who meet once every two to three
months. This panel may hear five minutes of oral argument during which, by
the way, they will ask all sorts of
evidentiary questions of counsel (who
are only too happy to testify), and they
render the final agency decision. They
do not see any of the witnesses, and
you know better than most how important observation of witnesses can be in
understanding transcripts, precise meaning and inflection, and in judging credibility. Step three: the matter goes to
superior court where it is subject to independent judgment review. But this
usually means a review of the record
as a practical matter, again without observing witnesses. This time the review
is conducted by a person well-trained
in the law, but lacking what in some
cases may be useful expertise. Step
four: the matter is reviewed on a substantial evidence basis by a court of
appeal. Step five: discretionary review
by the California Supreme Court, and
on occasion possible certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Where resisted,
an agency disciplinary action takes nine
to eleven years from receipt of original
consumer or other complaint to the
agency, including seven to nine of these
years in adjudication before the agency
or courts. The only interim remedies
available depend upon a preliminary
injunction by a superior court, usually
sitting in law and motion. The Medical
Board has averaged two to three of
these per year over the past five years.
During this same period, almost 1,000
doctors had their hospital privileges
jerked by private action of their peers
for incompetence.
The discipline output of regulatory
agencies is pathetic. And it is not just
regulation of trades and professions. The
Insurance Commissioner has been so
0

moribund historically that a superior
court in the Bourhiscase who examined
the sorry record felt compelled to issue
a writ of mandate to the Commissioner
which basically said: "For Christ's sake,
at least pretend to enforce the law."
The desirable model to use for these
proceedings is not mysterious. Do not
have five contested proceedings. That
is more than we have in criminal cases.
Do not have proceedings of such poor
quality that you feel compelled to superimpose a review to check possible
error, and then tack on yet another review because you are not sure of the
others, and then another.
It is possible to marry sufficient expertise with independence. Here is our
proposal: First, hold a hearing before an
ALJ. Where there are difficult questions requiring expertise, the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) should
have several panels of judges able to
understand specialized terminology in
those areas. As with the idea for judges,
have a list of experts available for ALJs
to call, to clarify the expert testimony of
either side if the ALJ thinks it will be
helpful. Afford full due process rights.
Allow the ALJ to make the final decision, without referral to the agency. Then
have a court of appeal review for possible error; do it on an independentjudgment basis, if desired, but have only a
single review for application of proper
standards and laws. Of course, allow
discretionary review to the Supreme
Court, but that is it. And then use the
specialized ALJ panel to fashion interim orders restricting practice or requiring monitoring pendente lite to protect the public.
Creating such a specialized panel of
judges who know of each other's decisions and who have the expertise, confidence, and experience to fashion fair
interim remedies results in consistency
and predictability-hallmarks of a properly functioning adjudicative system.
The State Bar has implemented just this
model over the past two years. The
settlement rate of cases reaching the
State Bar Court has jumped from 17%
to almost 50%-and why shouldn't it?
The attorneys know the judges and know
what they will do, and so the system
works more efficiently.
We attempted the same kind of reform with SB 2375 (Presley), a bill in
the medical area which was enacted last
year. In the original version of the bill,
we removed the practicing physicians
and the superior court from the process.
Unfortunately, the agency got put back
in, the superior court got put back in,
and-although we created a special list
of ALJs so we could have expertise,

predictability, and a body to go to for
interim remedies-OAH Director Karl
Engeman, in a kind of bureaucratic guerilla warfare, appointed just about all of
the ALJs in the state to the list, seeking
to void a reform which he had opposed.
The system we propose relieves you
of another category of case so you can
spend more time on the many needing
your judgment. It results in a higher
quality hearing by judges with both independence and expertise, assures findings of fact by the person who sees the
witnesses and hears them live, creates a
mechanism for interim remedies which
is workable, provides for judicial review, and takes 18 months instead of
seven years.
IDEA #6: End Our Drug Crisis
With a Creative Combination of Regulation, Prohibition, and State Predation. The final radical idea has to do
with drug enforcement. Here is a concrete problem with so many costs, with
so much damage, that just listing the
categories is daunting. We've lost much
of a generation of minority youths. Lost
them. Drug money finances gangs and
gang violence. Most homicides today
are drug-related. Thousands of drug babies, many with permanent lifetime
damage, are now reaching elementary
school. There's the prostitution, the burglaries, the robberies to support the habit.
Then there is the disease, the lethal disease. The government cost in terms of
social welfare is staggering, and it is not
close to meeting the demand. Our courts
are clogged with drug cases or cases
arising because of drugs. Our prisons
are filled with tens of thousands, all
costing us money, money, and more
money-money which could easily provide us with the resources to... can you
imagine what we could do? Lower taxes,
improve education, provide health care
and adequate nutrition to all children,
streamline transportation, create parks,
safeguard the environment.
What a price we are paying. And
what are we doing to solve this overwhelming problem? More of the same.
More of what we know fails. More police intrusion, more arrests, longer jail
terms, more and more. The recent huge
seizure of cocaine in New York, the
largest in U.S. history, will affect the
price of cocaine how much? Not a penny
more. And if it does increase it, that
does not solve the problem.
One alternative has been advanced
by many people in recent years-the
legalization of drugs. They argue that in
countries such as Holland legalization
has not resulted in a drug use epidemic,
that much of the harm flows from merely
its illegal status, that if used in private
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and off the roads it is essentially a victimless crime apart from the user, and
that alcohol is actually a more dangerous, addictive, and deleterious product
than are most drugs. Holland lacks a
large underclass, has a different and
more homogenous culture. And legalization has serious problems. However,
it might be conceded that those defending the status quo had better start listening to alternatives given their own dubious results.
There is another radical alternativeI say anotherradical alternative because
our current policy is radical, as in "extreme." It is certainly inconsistent and
arguably hypocritical. Here is the state
affirmatively subsidizing tobacco growers, allowing massive alcohol advertising directed at our young, and engaged
in the promotion of drug culture values
in its lottery gambling mania-you do
not have to earn riches, just pay the
state and "dream a little dream with
me," you may score big.
Before you dismiss the following alternative, suspend disbelief in order to
consider it fairly-and in relation not to
utopia but against the current state of
affairs.
Here's what you do. First, you maintain illegal status, adding one element.
You make all revenues from drug sales
contraband and suspend the holder in
due course and bona fide purchaser doctrines as to all property purchased with
such revenues. Wherever there is a prosecution, trace back all of the money and
take it back. All of it. Hot money stays
hot, and its value will plummet.
Second, and here is the most important part, you undercut the suppliers.
You provide free drugs administered by
the state to anyone who is already addicted to that drug. Why? This is a classic business requiring repeat customers.
Every new customer at the bottom of
the distribution may be a narc or a snitch.
Dealers prosper only by obtaining a reliable coterie of regular users, having
them repeat over and over again, doing
whatever they must to pay for it. Then
they cross-subsidize from that reservoir
of business to expand slowly and safely
to new customers. And their best means
of expansion are the friends of the regular users who are drawn into the net.
Consider the low rate at which persons
who are currently addicted end their
addiction voluntarily and without help.
And consider what we are paying in
terms of terminal medical treatment
costs for those who are contracting
AIDS, hepatitis and all the rest of the
emergency medical care we provide,
including all the blood recipients and
other ancillary victims.

Now imagine with me what would
happen with this solution-implemented
with great vigor. The administration of
the drugs would be accomplished more
safely and with less ancillary and horribly expensive medical consequences.
The state would have a chance to educate the addicts-and it would take only
addicts-and to try to persuade them to
abstain. The state would not be treating
any person who would not be getting
drugs anyway--except at much less social cost. And, we might be able to do
something about addicts who become
pregnant; we'll be more likely to know
about it.
To the dealer, how can he compete
with free drugs? In order to maintain
business, he is forced to sign on a new
player, develop a new addict. But as
soon as that person develops an addiction and becomes more and more typically desperate for the money necessary to feed it, he will go to the state
office and get it for free. The more
addicted and needy the addict is, the
more attractive will be not crime and
servitude to the dealer, but the free handout at the local CalDrug office. If implemented properly, the dealer will lose
his deeply addicted customers, one after another-and the state will not be
creating new customers.
To maintain profits, a dealer would
have to sell to more new customers,
compete with other dealers, or branch
out. But every new customer may be a
snitch or a narc, every new customer
may be dangerous. Like a dry cleaner or
a barber, the dealer needs that regular
group of repeaters-and for him that
need is critical. What happens when
they are deeply addicted? He loses them
to that damned price predator, the new
Japan of the drug market, CalDrug.
The dealers go out of business-by
the hundreds, by the thousands. The
market dries up from the bottom. The
mechanism for expansion is removed.
This approach does not rely on the failed
option of trying to curtail supply where
there is heavy demand; rather, as every
expert studying the subject agrees, it
attacks the problem from the end where
solution is promised-it eviscerates the
-private sector demand.
Lesson-it is not worth rounding up
cows if someone consistently rustles
them from the pen. The final consequence: very little money base for the'
gangs; few drug-abusing pregnant:
women-they would not get dangerous
drugs from the state while pregnant; a
decline in AIDS, hepatitis, and emergency care social costs; a dramatic decline in crimes to feed drug habitswhich would now be a totally gratu-
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itous piece of work to pay for something available for nothing. In combination with a major societal commitment
to equality of opportunity, and to intense societal drug and alcohol education, I believe these measures would
make a real difference. They would not
win the war on drugs, but they would
turn it from the current holocaust to
manageable brush battles on the periphery. If this idea will work as I am convinced it will, it would make your jobs
easier. You would have the two things
my best friend is always telling me he
needs more of-time and money.
Well, those are my six ideas. Maybe
they are radical, not just as my sons use
the term, but as those of us who remember the 1960s do as well. There is a
meritorious concept in government and
corporate planning called "zero-based
budgeting." Instead of starting with last
year's budget and arguing about adjustments year-to-year, you start all over as
if you had no budget and decide tabula
rasa.That way you do not assume what
perhaps should not be assumed. The
same zero-based approach is often best
used to address serious social problems.
Do not start from where we are-we
often get where we are through incompetence or happenstance. Imagine you
are creating whatever you are looking
at from the ground up, and ask what
your choice would be. Give what is in
place now no more credence than any
other alternative. Of course, you will
want to consider at some point the displacement cost of moving to a new solution from where you are now. But the
acceptance of what is often precludes
us from considering alternatives commendable on the merits.
One of the first lessons I learned in
stepping back from institutions was
given to me by Bernard Haeckel, a
young city planner from Austria. I was
directing a study of land use and local
government in California and Bernard
was on the 15-person team of professionals conducting the research. I made
a list of all of the questions which I
believed to be important, the big questions: Was the Williamson Act actually
preserving open space? Were general
plans working? How should the property tax interact with new development?
He just stared at me.
Two months later he came back with
his first draft. It did not address a single
topic on my list. Instead, he noted that
Americans have great respect for democracy, especially effective local government. He posited that such a democratic system, to be effective, requires
certain prerequisites: public officials
must be accountable; to be accountable
2
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in the first instance, people must know
who they are and what they do; and
citizens must know where they themselves are-literally, where they are.
He then proceeded on a five-block walking tour of Santa Clara County, passing
county or municipal boundaries 17 times
in a half hour, ink-blot-shaped jurisdictions, finding lines drawn down the
middle of one road so that when travelling north, the addresses went up on
one side of the road and down on the
other. He found over 50 special districts, governing everything from
schools to parks to hospitals to mosquito abatement. Some were run by appointed boards and some by elected
boards; most had their own separate
boundaries.
And everywhere he went, he asked
people simple questions: Where do you
live? Where do you work? He would
walk up to people who had worked in a
location for ten years and say: "Okay,
where are you?" He'd give them multiple choice help: City of Santa Clara,
County of Santa Clara, City of San Jose,
and he would pick the telephone company designated area, and so forth. He
asked: Who provides your trash collection? Who governs your parks? Provides your fire protection? And so on.
Bernard calculated the answers at
close to random in relation to their correctness, except that many people incorrectly assumed that their telephone
or mail address was their actual political address. Bernard wanted to know
how we could have meaningful democracy when we had no city centers, no
city boundaries, and the system was so
fragmented that people were intrinsically unable to hold accountable the
persons they elected to office.
And this was 1969, before Serrano,
so Bernard also wanted to know about
how we could provide the "equality of
opportunity" we were always talking
about when we financed our schools
from geographic districts, taking a
higher property tax rate in districts of
poor people, to provide meager funding
for their schools, while imposing a lower
tax rate in wealthy areas to lavish two
and three times the average daily attendance (ADA) monies on their children.
Well, Bernard ignored my list of what
he was to research. He apologized because, as he told me, "I had to start from
scratch because I did not know much
about your system going in, and I really
didn't get to all of your questions." On
reflection, I came to believe that his
questions were much more important
than were mine.
And now you are about to enter or
continue in an institution which is so
2

important to America. You are the ones
who often need to and do ask basic
questions. To back away from the contention before you and look both at precedent and at long-term effects; to provide our ground rules, our bright lines.
Many of you will have that role not only
as judges, but as citizens who will be
listened to with the attention warranted
by your very special credentials.
I hope you will be willing to countenance as judge and as citizen ideas and
positions which may seem radical, but
when examined from afar-from a distant place, from the far future looking
back-may be the better question or
the better answer, one which you will
not only consider, but one for which
you will stand and for which you will
adjudge.
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